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1 Introduction
Interest deductions from taxable income provide an incentive to rely on debt financing.
The capital structure of complex organizations, such as financial conglomerates or family
groups, is especially sensitive to such tax incentives. Their internal capital market allows
for the bail-out of subsidiaries, making both their leverage and tax shield higher than
in independent companies. It is therefore possible that tax policy contributes to the
insolvency of highly leveraged firm combinations. Such possibility is relevant not only in
a corporate finance perspective, but from a welfare point of view as well since the default
of just one such organization (Lehman Brothers) triggered financial instability.1 An
assessment of tax policy should however consider other tax provisions that target groups,
along with interest deductions. On the one hand, Intercorporate Dividend Taxation (IDT)
taxes profits distributed by subsidiaries to their parent company, resulting in a double
tax on dividends to ultimate shareholders that may dismantle groups (Morck, 2005). On
the other hand, Thin Capitalization rules cap interest deductions in subsidiaries. This
paper examines whether these additional tax provisions are able to contain the default
costs of a complex organization, in a second best setting.
To this end, this paper must first fill a vacuum in corporate finance theory, shedding
light on the nexus between corporate ownership and capital structure.
We model the choice of a controlling entity (an “entrepreneur”) who owns two cash-
flows (“firms”) and selects debt in each firm as well as their intercorporate links to maxi-
mize their overall value. As in Leland (2007), there are no real synergies associated with
the group structure and each firm is subject to the tax-bankruptcy cost trade-off. Debt
provides a tax shield since interests are tax-deductible; at the same time, higher debt
increases the likelihood of costly default. The entrepreneur also decides the ownership
structure of the firm combination. If the parent owns equity in its affiliate, it will receive
subsidiary profits as intercorporate dividends, proportionally to its ownership share. We
also allow the parent to commit to bail-out its insolvent but profitable affiliate, if it will
have sufficient funds ex-post 2. We finally assess the sensitivity of the resulting organi-
1Most systemically relevant financial firms have hundreds of subsidiaries. As of 2007, the most extreme
example was Citigroup with over 2400 subsidiaries, but 15 other financial conglomerates had more than
260, see Herring and Carmassi (2009). Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. had 433. A stylized representation
of its group structure is available in the Chapter 11 Proceedings Examiner Report. Also several groups in
manufacturing defaulted on their debts. Penati and Zingales (1997) describe the structure and leverage
of an early example of a family group default.
2Formal and informal bail-out commitments are common, see Bodie and Merton (1992) and Boot
Greenbaum and Thakor (1993).
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zation to tax policy.
Absent group-specific tax policies, we show that the parent fully commits to bail-out
its subsidiary. This is more effective than a partial commitment and allows the parent
company to become unlevered, while the subsidiary increases its own leverage and tax
shield. Intercorporate ownership is instead irrelevant to group value. That is, the optimal
complex organization may have no intercorporate ownership, as the entrepreneur owns
the subsidiary directly in a horizontal group or outsiders fully fund it as in a Special
Purpose Vehicle (SPV). At the other extreme, it may be a hierarchical group with either
full or partial intercorporate ownership as in a pyramid, so that both the entrepreneur
and outsiders own subsidiary shares. Irrelevance of ownership follows from the irrelevance
of dividend transfers across units, which occurs because the parent is optimally unlevered.
In such case, dividends do not help parent solvency and do not affect the expected default
costs of the group.
Against this background, our structural approach allows an analysis of corrective taxes
targeted to complex organizations. Introducing Intercorporate Dividend Taxes, one ex-
pects to both discourage indirect ownership - as suggested by Morck (2005) - and increase
leverage, by adding an additional tax layer to equity financing. Our results confirm the
first conjecture. The entrepreneur in a hierarchical group strictly prefers not to be taxed
twice and the optimal ownership avoids any intercorporate dividend. Accordingly, the
entrepreneur will directly own both units in a horizontal group, possibly sharing their
ownership with outside shareholders. Alternatively, it will relinquish subsidiary owner-
ship to outsiders while keeping the parent bail-out guarantee in place. The value of the
organization is unchanged, as well as default costs and welfare. It follows that intercor-
porate dividend taxes are unable to improve on financial stability.
Thin Capitalization rules explicitly aim at preserving tax payments of subsidiaries by
containing their leverage. Indeed, the cap imposed on the subsidiary causes debt shifting
towards the parent company, which is levered if the cap is sufficiently low.3 Our model
highlights that even when the cap is set to constrain subsidiary leverage to the stand
alone level, it may fail to contain expected default costs of hierarchical groups to the
stand-alone level. 4 We show, instead, that a calibrated combination of both Thin Capi-
3The association between larger intercorporate dividend payments with parent debt financing is visible
in France, where TC rules are in place but there are no taxes on intercorporate dividends (De Jong, De
Jong, Hege and Martens, 2012).
4Consistent with debt shifting, affiliates’ leverage responds to the introduction of Thin Cap rules in
US multinationals while consolidated leverage does not (Blouin, Huizinga, Laeven and Nicode`me, 2014).
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talization rules and IDT lowers expected default costs in the complex organization below
the ones of stand-alone firms. Caps on interest deductions restore the stabilizing effects
of internal bail-outs on subsidiaries. In turn, IDT avoids debt shifting onto the parent
company.
Our simulations, that follow the parametrization of Leland (2007), show that com-
bining the two tax policies reduces expected default costs in the group to $1.02 for every
100$ of expected cash-flow, as opposed to $8.13 without IDT and Thin Cap rules and
$1.78 for two independent firms.5 IDT and Thin Cap Rules correspondingly increase the
tax burden of the group to $35.57, up from $25.37.6 This compares to $35.40 for two
independent companies.
Results concerning the “no bail-out” case provide insight concerning the effect of new
prudential provisions, implied by the Volcker rule, that ban bail-outs of SPVs by bank
conglomerates. In such “no bail out” case, it is optimal for the parent to lever up, as there
are no reasons not to exploit its tax shield. Subsidiary dividends help the levered parent
to repay its debt when it would otherwise be insolvent. Thus its leverage is higher than
that of a comparable stand alone firm and optimal intercorporate ownership is 100%,
when there are no corrective taxes in place. The introduction of IDT may then reduce
intercorporate ownership and dividend support, thereby leading to lower optimal leverage.
As far as financial stability is concerned, we show that even a lower overall leverage may
deliver higher expected default costs due to distortions in the optimal allocation of debt
across firms - that is too much leverage in the subsidiary relative to the no-IDT allocation.
This insight on non-neutral IDT applies to other circumstances that make intercor-
porate ownership optimal, such as tax consolidation benefits or production synergies. In
such cases, it does not pay to dismantle a hierarchical structure unless the tax rate is
sufficiently high.
This paper contributes to the theory of corporate ownership. Ownership irrelevance
was first put forward by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), who observed that firm value is
insensitive to agency costs associated with ownership dispersion. Previous models of
complex organizations also focus on dispersed shareholders. In Almeida and Wolfenzon
(2006b), the entrepreneur prefers a pyramidal structure to a horizontal group when the
5This estimate overlooks the reduction in risk taking and externalities stemming from lower leverage
and default. However, it posits enforcement of tax rules.
6The use of non-debt tax shelters by the parent (as in De Angelo and Masulis (1980) and Graham
and Tucker (2006)) may increase these tax gains. Multinationals may additionally exploit the different
tax jurisdictions of subsidiaries (Altshuler and Grubert, 2003; Desai, Foley and Hines (2007); Huizinga,
Laeven and Nicode`me, 2008), while our model assumes equal tax rates so as to focus on an additional
tax arbitrage.
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affiliate has lower net present value, so as to involve outsiders in its funding. Our paper
shifts the focus from agency and dispersed shareholders onto default and intercorporate
ownership. Our model implies that the entrepreneur is indifferent to the structure of
ownership unless there are additional frictions (on top of the debt tax shield) such as
Thin Capitalization Rules, real synergies or limits to bail-outs. With such frictions, we
show that both firms are levered. Otherwise, the specialized capital structure derived
by Luciano and Nicodano (2014) for a wholly-owned subsidiary holds with any group
ownership. Our results thus provide a rationale for zero leverage companies (Strebulaev
and Yang, 2013).
To our knowledge, this is the first model of IDT and Thin Cap.7 Morck (2005) argues
that the introduction of IDT, which is still present in the US tax code, improved on
corporate governance during the New Deal by discouraging pyramidal groups. Our model
shows that the introduction of IDT dismantles hierarchical groups if ownership irrelevance
holds. This change in ownership structure is however welfare neutral, in a world without
governance concerns, being unable to affect default costs. If other synergies or a ban
on bail-outs break irrelevance, IDT provides the incentive to transform a wholly-owned
subsidiary into a partially owned one only if the tax rate is sufficiently high. Thus, IDT
may give rise to a pyramid, unless the tax rate decreases in the ownership share of the
parent company - a feature of the US tax code.
Our insights on value, ownership and internal bail-outs of complex organizations apply
well to financial conduits, that do not appear to be subject to Thin Capitalization Rules.
In the IDT scenario of our model, outsiders entirely finance the subsidiary whose debt
value is enhanced by the parental guarantee. This way the subsidiary circumvents IDT
and still enjoys interest deductions. In SPVs, the sponsoring firm and investors agree upon
the state contingent subsidization of the vehicle, beyond the sponsor’s formal obligations.
Conduits, that can be incorporated either as a proper subsidiary or as an orphan Special
Purpose Vehicle, are structured to be tax neutral as they would otherwise be subject to
double taxation (see Gorton and Souleles, 2006).
This interpretation of our results is supported by two additional observations. First,
securitization increases with the corporate tax rate, i.e. with incentives to exploit the
7Several papers analyze the effect of personal dividend taxes on corporate choices. They focus on
their impact on dividend payout, investment and equity issues (see Chetty and Saez, 2010, and references
therein), but ignore intercorporate links and leverage. On the contrary, we fix payout, investment and
equity issues and analyze how IDT affect intercorporate links and leverage. Our limited understanding
of complex organizations, as well as their prevalence among multinationals, family firms and financial
intermediaries, provide support to our approach.
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tax shield (Han, Park and Pennacchi, 2015). Second, Gropp and Heider (2009) find
that deposit insurance and capital requirements fail to explain bank capital structure
which instead responds to the tax-bankruptcy trade-off in non-financial firms, albeit
with a surprisingly higher leverage. Our model points to the bail-out commitment as
the explanation for the higher tax benefits of banks, relative to non-financial firms, that
explains their surprisingly higher leverage.8
This is not the first paper pointing to an association between tax policy, leverage and
financial instability. De Mooji, Keen and Orihara (2013) simulate the effects of new tax
measures that contain aggregate bank leverage. With a similar motivation, this paper
develops a micro analysis of firm/bank incentives to lever up. A policy implication of our
analysis is that extending Thin Capitalization rules to SPVs should contain the default
probability of systemic banks and increase welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
characterizes optimal intercorporate ownership, credibility and leverage choices without
IDT. Section 3 examines corrective tax tools. It proves the welfare neutrality of IDT and
studies Thin Capitalization rules. A discussion of IDT with either tax consolidation or
a ban on bail-outs follows. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix. The
Appendix also contrasts IDT in the US and in the EU, while we refer to Webber (2010)
and OECD (2012) for worldwide Thin Cap rules.
2 The model
This section describes our modeling set-up, following Leland (2007).
At time 0, an entrepreneur owns two firms, i = P, S.9 Each unit has a random operating
cash flow Xi which is realized at time T . We denote with G(·) the cumulative distribution
function and with f(·) the density of Xi, identical for the two units and with g(·, ·) the
joint distribution of XP and XS. At time 0, the entrepreneur selects the face value Fi
of the zero-coupon risky debt to issue so as to maximize the total arbitrage-free value of
equity, Ei, and debt, Di:
8We do not investigate the mechanism ensuring full commitment. These range from courts to a
sufficiently large entrepreneur’s ownership stake. In the case of financial conduits, the mix of cash-flow
pooling, tranching and the repurchase of the junior tranche by the sponsoring parent contribute to
overcome information asymmetries (De Marzo and Duffie, 1999).






At time T , realized cash flows are distributed to financiers. Equity is a residual claim:
shareholders receive operational cash flow net of corporate income taxes and the face
value of debt paid back to lenders. A unit is declared insolvent when it cannot meet its
debt obligations. Its income, net of the deadweight loss due to default costs, is distributed
first to the tax authority and then to lenders.
The firm pays a flat proportional income tax at an effective rate 0 < τi < 1 and
suffers proportional dissipative costs 0 < αi < 1 in case of default. Interests on debt are
deductible from taxable income.10 The presence of a tax advantage for debt generates a
trade-off for the firm: on the one side, increased leverage results in tax benefits, while on
the other it leads to higher expected default costs since – everything else being equal –
a highly levered firm is more likely to default. Maximizing the value of debt and equity
is equivalent to minimizing the cash flows which the entrepreneur expects to lose in the




Ti + Ci. (2)
The expected tax burden of each firm is proportional to expected taxable income, that
is to operational cash flow Xi, net of the tax shield X
Z
i . In turn, the tax shield coincides
with interest deductions, which are equal to the difference between the nominal value of
debt Fi, and its market value Di: X
Z
i = Fi −Di. The tax shield is a convex function of
Fi.
Absent any link between units, the expected tax burden in each unit separately – each
taken as a stand-alone (SA) firm – is equal to (see Leland (2007)):
TSA(Fi) = τiφE[(Xi −XZi )+], (3)
where the expectation is computed under the risk-neutral probability11 and φ is the
discount factor. Increasing the nominal value of debt increases the tax shield, thereby
reducing the tax burden because the market value of debt, Di, increases with Fi at a
decreasing rate (reflecting higher risk).
10No tax credits or carry-forwards are allowed.
11This allows to incorporate a risk premium in the pricing of assets without having to specify a utility
function.
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Similarly, expected default costs are proportional to cash flows when default takes
place, i.e. when net cash flow is insufficient to reimburse lenders. Default occurs when








Default costs represent a deadweight loss to the economy, as they do not represent a
redistribution among firm stakeholders. They increase in the default cost parameter,
αi, as well as in (positive) realized cash flows when the firm goes bankrupt. A rise in
the nominal value of debt, Fi, increases the default threshold, X
d
i , thereby increasing
expected default costs.
The sum of the levered firm value and the tax burden of each unit is a measure of the
welfare generated by this representative organization:




W represents the total value created by the firm and distributed to its stakeholders:
lenders, shareholders and tax authorities (after paying workers, suppliers etc). The change
in welfare, in response to tax policy, is equal to the difference in default costs with opposite
sign: ∆W = −∆C. In our setting, the expressions “welfare increase” and “reduction in
default costs” are equivalent, and capture the notion that financial stability improves on
welfare.
The default of levered organizations triggers the default of other lending organizations,
generating additional bankruptcy costs. This externality is not captured by the above set-
up. Moreover, our full information set up with exogenous cash-flow distributions does
not account for excess risk taking induced by leverage. Thus, the default costs above
should be considered a lower bound to the welfare costs of financial instability.
2.1 Intercorporate Bail-Outs and Ownership
This section provides details on intercorporate linkages. We first model intercorporate
ownership and bail-out transfers that characterize complex organizations. Next, we as-
sess how the two impact on both the tax burden and default costs of the group, given
exogenous debt levels.
The parent owns a fraction, ω, of its subsidiary’ s equity. The subsidiary distributes
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its profits after paying the tax authority and lenders, (XnS −FS)+, where XnS are its cash
flows net of corporate income taxes. Assuming a unit payout ratio, the parent receives a
share ω of the subsidiary profits at time T . 12Let the effective (i.e. gross of any tax credit)
tax rate on intercorporate dividend be equal to 0 ≤ τD < 1. Intercorporate dividend taxes
are thus equal to a fraction ωτD of the subsidiary cash flows. The expected present value
of the intercorporate dividend net of taxes is thus equal to
ID = φωE
[
(1− τD)(XnS − FS)+
]
. (6)




P + (1− τD)ω(XnS − FS)+. (7)
Equation (7) indicates that dividends provide the parent with an extra-buffer of cash
that can help it remain solvent in adverse contingencies in which it would default as a
stand-alone company. It follows that the dividend transfer generates an internal rescue
mechanism within the firm combination, whose size increases in the parent ownership, ω,
and falls in the dividend tax rate, τD, given the capital structure.
We do not analyze personal dividend and capital gains taxation levied on shareholders
(other than the parent). We therefore assume that the positive personal dividend (and
capital gains) tax rate are already included in τ , which is an effective tax rate. We
also that the personal tax rate on distributions is equal across parent and subsidiary,
so as to rule out straightforward tax arbitrage between the two. Similarly, we focus on
the entrepreneur’s choice of direct versus indirect ownership without explicitly involving
minority shareholders.
As for the internal bail-out promise, we model it following Luciano and Nicodano
(2014). The parent commits to transfer cash to the other, in order to prevent its default,
if it will have sufficient funds. This promise implies a transfer equal to FS −XnS from the
parent to its subsidiary, if the subsidiary is insolvent but profitable (0 < XnS < FS) and
if the parent stays solvent after the transfer (XnP −FP ≥ FS −XnS ). Lenders perceive the
promise as being honored with probability pi.13
12Results below are qualitatively unchanged as long as the payout ratio is positive and inflexible. The
evidence on the tax sensitivity of dividend payouts for corporate shareholders suggests that they do
not adjust to corporate tax clienteles (Barclay et al, 2009; Dahlquist et al. (2013), at least completely
(Holmen et al. (2008)).
13The parent has an option, but not an obligation, to transfer funds to its subsidiary. This bail-out
promise differs, in this important respect, from both internal loans and contractual guarantees. Both
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We can now show how dividends and the bail-out promise affect default costs and the
tax burden of the group.
2.2 The Tax - Bankruptcy Trade-Off in Complex Organizations
We now analyze how the tax-bankruptcy trade-off changes due to intercorporate links, i.e.
the presence of a bail-out promise from the parent to its subsidiary and intercorporate
ownership, ω, given the debt levels FP , FS. Equations (3) and (4) respectively define
the expected tax burden, TSA(Fi), and default costs CSA(Fi) for each unit as a stand-
alone firm. These coincide with group values when there is zero intercorporate ownership
(ω = 0) and no bail-out promise (pi = 0). Default costs in the subsidiary, CS, are lower
due to the bail-out transfer from the parent. Such reduction in expected default costs
(Γ) is equal to





Subsidiary expected default costs are lower the higher the credibility of the bail-out
promise and the greater the ability of the parent to rescue its subsidiary. The indicator
function 1{·} defines the set of states of the world in which rescue occurs, i.e. when both
the subsidiary defaults without transfers (first term) and the parent has sufficient funds
for rescue (second term). The function h, which is defined in the Appendix, imply that
rescue by the parent is likelier the smaller the parent debt, FP .
Subsidiary dividends impact on the parent’s default costs, as follows. The cum-
dividend cash flow in the parent – defined in equation (7) – is larger the larger is intercor-
porate ownership, ω. Such additional cash flow raises both the chances that the parent
is solvent and lenders’ recovery rate in insolvency. Expected default costs saved by the
parent, ∆C, are equal to:






<FP } − 1{0<Xn,ωP <FP }
)+] ≥ 0. (9)
The first (second) term in square brackets measures the parent’s cash flows that is lost
in default without (with) the dividend transfer. It is easy to show that the parent default
costs fall in dividend receipts net of taxes. These in turn increase in ω(1 − τD) and fall
in subsidiary debt.
Finally, when intercorporate dividends are taxed, the group tax burden increases
help the subsidiary service its debt, but may impair the parent’s service of debt.
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relative to the case of two stand-alone firms. We denote this change as ∆T :
∆T (FS , ω) = TS(FS , ω) + TP (FP , ω)− TSA(FP ) + TSA(FS) = φωτDE[(XnS − FS)+] ≥ 0. (10)
This is positive, and increasing in subsidiary’s dividend. In turn, dividend increases in
profits after the service of debt, (XnS − FS)+, and in intercorporate ownership, ω.
2.3 Optimal Intercorporate Links and Leverage
This section determines the optimal firm organization, without dividend taxes, that min-
imizes total default costs and tax burdens (as in equation (2)):
min
FS ,FP ,ω,pi
TS(FS, ω) + TP (FP ) + CS(FP , FS, pi) + CP (FS, FP , ω), (11)
through the choice of its capital structure (FP and FS) and of its intercorporate links
(pi, ω). We report the Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated to this program at the beginning
of Appendix B. The value-maximizing organization may result in two stand-alone firms,
with no links (pi∗ = 0, ω∗ = 0). It may instead be a complex hierarchical group, with both
intercorporate ownership and a bail-out mechanism (pi∗ > 0, ω∗ > 0); in an organization
with internal bail-outs but no intercorporate ownership (pi∗ > 0, ω∗ = 0) as in horizontal
groups or in subsidiaries fully financed by outsiders; or in a structure with partially-owned
subsidiaries but no bail-out promises (pi∗ = 0, ω∗ > 1)14. Before proceeding, we introduce
the following lemma that summarizes the properties of ∆C and ∆T with respect to debt
levels:
Lemma 1 The reduction in default costs due to the intercorporate dividend transfer, ∆C,
are decreasing in subsidiary debt, FS, and increasing in intercorporate ownership ω. The
additional tax burden due to intercorporate dividend taxation (τD > 0), ∆T , is decreasing
in subsidiary debt, insensitive to parent debt, FP , and non-decreasing in intercorporate
ownership ω.
The higher is subsidiary debt, the lower are subsidiary dividends - given its exogenous
cash flows. This implies both reduced support to the parent and lower IDT burden. As
for ownership, the higher the share ω the lower the default costs in the parent thanks
14For simplicity we assume that there is no “piercing of the corporate veil” when intercorporate own-
ership reaches 100%, i.e. the parent enjoys limited liability vis-a´-vis its subsidiary’s lenders also when it
is the sole owner of its subsidiary.
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to the dividend payment from its subsidiary. However, the tax burden associated with
intercorporate dividend increases, for a positive IDT tax rate.
The proposition below deals with the joint determination of leverage and ownership
structure, given the bail-out promise:
Lemma 2 Let τD = 0. If the sum of the tax burden and default costs in each unit is
convex in the face values of debt, then there exists a p¯i > 0 such that
(i) if pi > p¯i, then parent is unlevered (F ∗P = 0), the subsidiary is levered and the optimal
intercorporate ownership share is indefinite; (ii) otherwise, both firms are levered and the
parent fully owns its subsidiary.
Lemma 2 states that a sufficient commitment frees the parent firm from debt and the
associated default costs. The value of the firm combination is therefore insensitive to
intercorporate ownership and dividend receipts, as they do not affect the tax-bankruptcy
trade-off.
Absent a sufficiently credible bail-out mechanism, part (ii) of Lemma 2 indicates that
the value maximizing intercorporate ownership is 100%, because subsidiary dividends help
servicing debt of the parent thereby allowing it to increase its own tax shield. Setting up
two stand-alone firms (ω = 0;pi = 0) is therefore sub-optimal for the entrepreneur. It is
also suboptimal for the entrepreneur to own directly shares in the subsidiary, and/or to
allow outside shareholders to buy subsidiary shares (ω < 1).
It is now straightforward to characterize the optimal intercorporate ownership, the
credibility of the bail-out promise and the associated capital structure.
Theorem 1 Assume τD = 0. Then the bail-out promise is fully credible (pi
∗ = 1) and
intercorporate ownership (ω∗) is indefinite. Moreover, optimal debt in the complex organi-
zation exceeds the debt of two stand-alone companies if and only if the ratio of percentage
default costs to the tax rate α
τ
is lower than a constant Q.
We know that a subsidiary has higher leverage and value than two stand-alone com-
panies if debts are backed by a maximally credible guarantee and if the subsidiary is
wholly-owned (Luciano and Nicodano, 2014). The theorem 1 shows that such extreme
capital structure carries over to any intercorporate ownership, and that full commitment
to bail-out is value maximizing. This is is because the bail-out guarantee prevents de-
fault costs from rising faster than tax savings the more, the firmer the commitment.15
15As debt shifts from the parent towards its subsidiary, the subsidiary’s tax burden increases at an
increasing rate. The interest rate required by lenders grows as they recover a lower share of their debt
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This result provides a rationale to the zero leverage puzzle (Strebulaev, 2013).16 The-
orem 1 is an ownership-irrelevance proposition. Due to the bail-out commitment, the
entrepreneur is indifferent between sharing ownership with outsiders (by setting up a
pyramidal group with partial intercorporate ownership and partial outsiders’ ownership
in the subsidiary; or a horizontal group with partial outsiders’ ownership), keeping full
ownership in the affiliate (through either 100% intercorporate ownership or 100% direct
ownership), or funding the guaranteed subsidiary through outside financiers. Such irrele-
vance may break down in the next sections due to the presence of corrective tax measures,
a ban on bail-outs or real synergies arising from intercorporate ownership.
Agency costs of intercorporate ownership vis-a`-vis outside financiers can also subvert
ownership irrelevance. For instance, a large literature argues that the cost of outside
equity increases with intercorporate ownership when the entrepreneur correspondingly
increases the control wedge. In such a case, the entrepreneur of Theorem 1 is indifferent
between all ownership configurations but pyramidal groups. Pyramidal groups may still
be value maximizing if the entrepreneur derives a compensating amount of private benefits
from intercorporate ownership per se, rather than from the separation of ownership and
control.
3 Tax Policy, Ownership Structure and Financial Sta-
bility
This section analyzes the effects of additional tax policies on the financial stability of
complex organizations. Such provisions may effectively address the incentives to lever up
provided by interest deductibility. The analysis starts from IDT, as it may be able to
dismantle complex organizations altogether (Morck, 2005) through the double-taxation
of dividends. It then studies the effects of “Thin Capitalization” rules, that directly
cap interest deductions in subsidiaries, thereby putting an upper bound on subsidiary’s
incentives to lever up (Blouin et al, 2014). This section proves that these measures do
not achieve the welfare level provided by stand-alone firms, unless they are combined.
in default. At the same time the bail-out transfer from the unlevered parent contains the increase in the
subsidiary’s default.
16As for financial conglomerates, the Joint Administrators’ progress report (PWC, 2009, p.7) reveals
the leverage position of its main European subsidiary. The net equity of Lehman Brothers International
Europe was equal to just 1.3% of the gross book value of market positions at September 2008, and an
even smaller proportion of nominal outstanding positions. The parent company was guaranteeing this
subsidiary along with 16 others.
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We also discuss the effects of synergies deriving from tax consolidation. Finally, we
explore the consequences of a ban on bail-outs inside the group.
3.1 Neutrality of Intercorporate Dividend Taxes
So far, we assumed no other tax provision but corporate income taxes and interest de-
ductibility. The following theorem characterizes optimal intercorporate links and capital
structure in presence of IDT.
Theorem 2 When the tax rate on intercorporate dividend becomes positive (τD > 0),
optimal intercorporate ownership is zero (ω∗ = 0) while the capital structure and commit-
ment to bail-outs are unchanged.
Absent IDT, Theorem 1 shows that the parent may own up to 100% of subsidiary
shares, as observed in EU family firms (Faccio and Lang, 2012). Theorem 2 proves that
IDT discourages full intercorporate ownership, consistent with intuition. As soon as the
tax rate τD is non-null, optimal intercorporate ownership drops to zero so as to avoid
the double taxation of dividends. A fully credible guarantee - and the associated capital
structure - remains optimal. Indeed, the guarantee still ensures the optimal exploitation
of the tax bankruptcy trade-off.
A real-world counterpart of the complex organization envisaged by Theorem 2 is a
sponsor with its orphan SPV. In such organization, the sponsoring parent and investors
agree to the state contingent subsidization of the SPV, beyond the sponsor’s formal
obligations (see Gorton and Souleles, 2006).17 This ensures the SPV exploits the tax-
bankruptcy trade-off effectively, paying no intercorporate dividend and therefore no IDT.
Another complex organization implied by this theorem is a horizontal group.18 The
entrepreneur and, possibly, outside shareholders directly buy shares in both the former
parent and the former subsidiary. The latter exploits the interest deductions thanks to a
bail-out guarantee from its former parent.
The following corollary, which follows from the previous theorem, summarizes the
effects of IDT on welfare.
17Guarantees may take several forms - from recourse ones, to short-term loan commitments, to written
put options. Sponsoring banks typically choose indirect credit enhancement methods that minimize
capital requirements (see Jones, 2000). For instance, the junior tranche acts as guarantee for all senior
tranches. When the sponsor bank retains recourse to this tranche, which is often less than 8% of the
pool, the capital requirement is proportional to the junior tranche only and rating agencies attribute a
AAA rating to the senior tranche.
18The prudential regulation arbitrage in this context explains why banks prefer SPVs to horizontal
groups.
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Corollary 1 The introduction of a tax on intercorporate dividend leads to the dismantling
of the hierarchical group. However, it affects neither value nor financial stability.
In line with Morck (2005), Corollary 1 highlights the ability of IDT to dismantle hi-
erarchical groups, when the payout is inflexible and there are no real synergies deriving
from the hierarchical structure. In our setting, that abstracts from moral hazard, Corol-
lary 1 points out that dismantling the hierarchical structure (either pyramidal or with
fully owned subsidiaries) is welfare neutral.
A few remarks are useful. First, this neutrality result is reinforced if the subsidiary
payout ratio is set to zero and the parent receives subsidiary’s profits in other ways. In
such a case, dismantling the hierarchical group is unnecessary. One way is a subsidiary
share repurchase programme, that generates a capital gain instead of a dividend - provided
the tax rate on gains is lower. Another way is the parent sale of assets to its subsidiary.
A third way is an inter-company loan to the parent, at below-market rates.19
Second, recall that we collapsed the personal dividend tax into the effective corporate
income tax to avoid cumbersome notation, and we set equal tax rates for parent and
subsidiary. Theorem 1, and thus the previous corollary, hold as long as the personal tax
rate on dividends from the parent is the same as the one on dividends from its subsidiary.
Otherwise, the shift from intercorporate ownership to direct ownership may no longer be
neutral.
Third, so far there are no costs associated with ownership transformations. These
can be sizeable when real synergies explain group structure. We discuss this case after
considering Thin Capitalization rules.
Finally, IDT neutrality hinges on the reliability of the bail-out promise. In our full
information context, courts or the central bank may enforce the bail-out promise even if
the parent’s ex-post incentives to honor the bail-out promise are weak. In section 3.5 we
will characterize intercorporate ownership when such external mechanisms fail and the
parent is unable to credibly commit to bailing out its subsidiary.
3.2 Thin Capitalization rules
Tax authorities know that guaranteed subsidiaries may have too little equity capital
(that is, too high leverage), due to the exploitation of the tax shield. This is why they
19Related-party transaction regulation restricts the transfer of funds from the subsidiary through
non-dividend distributions. For an overview of EU member states approach see European Commission
(2011), p.60. Central banks also freeze the transfer of funds from domestic bank subsidiaries to the
foreign holding company.
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limit the fiscal deductibility of subsidiary interests through “Thin Capitalization” rules.
These measures, which directly cap interest deductions in subsidiaries or indirectly restrict
them by constraining debt/equity ratios below a certain level, cause a departure from the
optimal capital structure we described in previous theorems. We now characterize the
optimal capital structure following the introduction of Thin Capitalization rules.
Theorem 3 When the leverage constraint in the subsidiary is binding, that is F ∗S = K,
then: a) the parent is optimally levered, as long as K ≤ K¯(αS) and ω∗ = 1 when τD = 0;
b) the introduction of IDT lowers parent debt when τD > τ¯D.
Part (a) shows that debt shifts to the parent, if debt in the subsidiary is constrained
to be lower than a level, K¯, that depends on proportional default costs. The forced
reduction in subsidiary debt makes an unlevered parent sub-optimal. Forgone gains from
using the tax shield are no longer offset by tax shield gains accruing to the subsidiary
thanks to a more credible guarantee. In turn, full intercorporate ownership ensures higher
intercorporate dividends. These help the parent repay its obligations, increasing optimal
parent leverage.
The introduction of IDT increases the cost of paying out dividends.20
As for the effects on financial stability, a carefully calibrated mix of thin capitalization
rules and IDT increases welfare delivered by groups above the level achieved by stand-
alone companies. The following theorem indicates that this is true for certain levels of
the tax rate on intercorporate dividend, τD, when subsidiary debt is constrained to the
stand-alone level.
Theorem 4 When the leverage constraint in the subsidiary is binding to the stand-alone
level, F ∗S = F
∗
SA, and τD > τ¯D, the default costs of a group do not exceed those of two
stand-alone firms. Moreover, the group shows both lower default costs and higher value
than the stand-alone organization.
The result of the previous theorem obtains because the parent optimal debt falls
while subsidiary debt is capped. As a direct consequence, default costs are lower than in
the stand-alone case. Moreover, the group remains more valuable than the stand-alone
organization.
20Indeed, optimal intercorporate ownership and dividends fall. In turn, this reduces the parent debt
for several parametric combinations. In particular, simulations show that this always happens when τD
is high enough to drag optimal intercorporate ownership to 0, down from 100% without IDT.
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Thus, Theorem 4 suggests that a mix of the two tax policies makes the privately
optimal choice, the group, also (second-best) welfare optimal. In order to examine the
robustness of this conjecture, we extend our comparative analysis to the Merger (M)
using a numerical exercise proposed in Leland (2007).
Table 1: Base-case parameters
Parameter Value
Cash flow actual mean (µ) 100
Annual cash flow volatility (σ) 22%
Default costs (α) 23%
Effective tax rate (τ) 20%
Intercorporate dividend tax rate (τD) 7%
Discount rate (φ) 0.7835
Table 1: This table reports the set of base-case parameters we use in all our numerical simulations, unless
otherwise stated.
Table 1 collects the parameters in our numerical analysis.21
The two firms are assumed to have equally distributed Gaussian cash flows, and equal
default cost rate and tax rate.
Table 2 and Figure 1 report the results for ρ = 0.2. The first column of the table
refers to a merger, the second one to two stand-alone firms, while the last two columns
refer to a group.
The Table shows that the welfare delivered by the merger exceeds the one of two stand
alone companies. Such gains are due to diversification benefits, that reduce its default
costs relative to stand-alone firms, from 1.78 to 1.23 for every 100$ value of expected
cash flow. Yet, the merger also has higher value, thanks to higher debt (117 instead of
114) that translate into higher tax shield.22 Group default costs are equal to 1.56 when
they are subject only to Thin Capitalization rules that constrain subsidiary debt to the
stand-alone one level. Group default costs are lower than in stand alone firms, despite
a much higher face value of debt (138). However, they are higher than in the merger
21Parameters are calibrated following Leland (2007) on a BBB-rated firm. We fix the IDT tax rate,
τD, to the lowest applicable rate in the US.
22This is not always true. Absent tax motives, mergers are less valuable when coinsurance gains are
lower than contagion costs (Banal-Estanol et al., 2013). With a tax -bankruptcy trade-off, the merger
is less valuable than stand-alone units when cash flow volatility is different across units and cash flow
correlation is higher than a threshold level (Leland, 2007). The PS structure is more valuable than
the merger in those circumstances, as well as in the case of perfect cash flow correlation (Luciano and
Nicodano, 2014).
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Table 2: Merger and PS
M SA PS, no tax policy PS, TC no IDT PS, TC+IDT
Value (ν) 163.14 162.94 166.59 (49.46; 117.13) 163.88 (120.81; 43.07) 163.36 (80.65; 82.72)
Ownership share (ω) - - indefinite 100% 0%
Default costs (C) 1.23 1.78 8.13 (0; 8.13) 1.56 (1.12; 0.44) 1.02 (0.78; 0.24)
Tax burden (T ) 35.43 35.40 25.40 (20.01; 5.39) 34.69 (16.85; 17.84) 35.57 (17.81; 17.76)
Welfare (W ) 198.78 198.34 191.99 198.57 199.09
Face Value of Debt (F ) 117 114 220 (0; 220) 138 (81; 57) 112 (55; 57)
Table 2: The first two columns of this table compare the optimal properties of a merger (M column) and
of two stand-alone units (SA). The rest depict a PS structure with full commitment to bail-outs, when
there are either no corrective taxes (PS, no tax); or Thin Capitalization ruleesonly (PS, TC no IDT )
or both (PS, TC+IDT). Subsidiary debt in the last two columns is set to be lower than or equal the
stand-alone one, F ∗S ≤ 57. Optimal values of the parent and the subsidiary unit are reported in brackets.
Equity of the subsidiary is net of dividend.
case (1.23), that therefore delivers higher welfare. Groups are the value maximizing
organization, with 163.88 for every 100$ value of expected cash flow, thanks to a much
lower tax burden (34.69).
When IDT is introduced along with Thin Capitalization rules (fourth column), debt
capacity in the group is limited to 112 and its default costs fall to 1.02. Also the tax
burden increases to 35.57, up from 34.69. Despite the combination of thin capitalization
rules and IDT, the group remains the value maximizing choice for the entrepreneur, who
can sell its activities at 163.36 for every 100$ value of expected cash flow, as opposed to
163.14 in the merger case.
In this case, the privately optimal organization is also second-best welfare optimal (de-
livering welfare equal to 199.09 versus 198.78 in the merger case).
Figure 1 represents the same firm combinations as the table, but adds the case of an
unregulated group with internal bail-outs for comparison. This figure provides a rationale
for corrective tax policies, reporting the extent of both subsidiary leverage (220) and its
default costs (8.13) when there a no corrective tax tools. It clearly indicates that the
enforcement of the combined tax tools is able to limit financial instability.
3.3 Tax Policy and Financial Stability
This section provides more details on losses borne by lenders upon subsidiary default.
These are particularly important for welfare when the complex organization is a system-
ically relevant financial intermediary, that acts as guarantor for securitized obligations.
Such losses may in fact trigger the default of a large number of financing outsiders,
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Figure 1: This figure reports value, tax burden, debt and default costs with reference to a group with
internal bail-out and 1. neither Thin Cap rules nor IDT (PS no TC no IDT); 2.with Thin Cap Rules
only (PS TC no IDT); 3. with both Thin Cap rules and IDT (PS TC+IDT) 4. a merger (M); 5. two
stand-alone firms (SA). The light part of the bars displaying PS figures refers to the parent company.
thereby inducing the central bank to bail out the originator.23 We keep on abstracting
from prudential regulation of financial conglomerates (see Freixas et al., 2007), because
capital requirements for SPVs were not present prior to the crisis. Moreover, their cur-
rent discretionary, risk-based application (Board of Governors, 2013) need not restore
tax receipts and contain the default costs we point to, as the latter are independent from
agency issues.
Table 3 reports the endogenous default probabilities and losses upon default of Parent-
Subsidiary structures, along with those of both optimal Stand Alone firms and Mergers.
Without corrective taxes, the subsidiary enjoys bail-outs from its parent when the sub-
sidiary is profitable and when the parent has sufficient cash-flows. Despite bail-outs, the
subsidiary incurs into larger losses upon default (67.72%) with much higher probability
(47.38%) than a stand alone firm (50.74% and 11.09% respectively).
Subjecting the subsidiary to Thin Capitalization rules helps correcting such distor-
tions. Thanks to a more balanced capital structure and to the parent support, the sub-
sidiary default probabilities falls below (6.29%) the ones of a stand alone firm. However,
23Erel, Nadauld and Stulz (2014) find that banks with larger holdings of even highly-rated tranches
had worse performance during the crisis.
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Table 3: Tax policy and financial stability
M SA PS, no tax policy PS, TC no IDT PS, TC+IDT
Default Probability (DP ) 6.40% 11.09% 0% (0%; 47.38%) 4.25% (9.51%; 6.29%) 1.94% (10.22%; 3.85%)
Loss Given Default (LGD) 43.55% 50.74% ( - ; 67.72%) (46.86%; 56.81%) (51.11%; 61.90%)
Table 3: This table contrasts default probabilities and loss given default in the optimal configuration
of the Merger (M column), the Stand Alone (SA column) and in the PS structures when there is no
specific tax policy (PS, no tax policy) when thin capitalization rules only are present (PS, TC no IDT)
and when they are coupled with IDT (PS, TC+IDT). For PS, joint default probabilities of the two units
are reported outside the brackets, which report parent and subsidiary bankruptcy likelihood respectively.
Loss given default is provided for the two units separately only.
the lenders’ loss given default (56.81%) is higher because the subsidiary never defaults
when it is profitable. At the same time, the parent is less risky than its stand alone
counterpart, despite its higher leverage, thanks to the receipt of subsidiary dividends.
Adding IDT to Thin Cap rules reduces debt issuance in the parent, allowing it to
rescue more often its subsidiary. More support reduces the likelihood of default in the
subsidiary to 3.85%, because the subsidiary goes bankrupt only in very adverse scenarios.
This implies that loss given default is higher than in the absence of IDT (61.90% vs.
56.81%). Now bail-outs allow to remarkably reduce the likelihood of default with respect
to equally leveraged stand alone companies.24 However, conditional on a default the
percentage losses incurred in by lenders of a well capitalized subsidiary are higher than
in a stand alone firm with identical book leverage. This is a perverse effect of conditional
bailouts that even Thin Capitalization rules and IDT cannot correct.
3.4 Hierarchical Group Synergies: Tax Consolidation
In previous sections, group affiliates exploit financial synergies only. They enjoy internal
bail-out transfers and coordinated capital structure choices, that allow to optimize the
tax shield. Other synergies, relating for instance to investment choices (see Stein (1997)
and Matvos and Seru (2014)) or product market competition and workers’ incentives
(Fulghieri and Sevilir (2011)) may stem from intercorporate ownership, making it less
responsive to changes in tax rates. A relevant group-related synergy is tax consolidation,
by which a profitable parent can use subsidiary losses to reduce its taxable income, and
viceversa. The consolidation option is valuable because it implies that the tax burden of
the group never exceeds the one of stand-alone firms, and is typically smaller.
24For instance, a stand alone company raising the debt of the SPV when no Thin Cap rules and IDT
are present (220), would default 98.81% of the times instead of 47.38%.
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The impact of consolidation on previous results depends on its design.25 With a
minimum prescribed threshold for consolidation, ω¯ > 0, optimal intercorporate ownership
can be equal to such threshold, instead of being indefinite. This outcome depends on the
correlation between operating cash-flows. The higher is the cash flow correlation, the
more valuable is the tax shield (and the associated capital structure) relative to the tax
consolidation option (and the associated capital structure). Theorem 1 is likely to hold
for sufficiently high cash flow correlation.
The presence of IDT, together with tax consolidation, generates a trade-off concerning
the choice of ownership, ω. Increasing it up to the prescribed threshold, ω¯, lowers the tax
burden through consolidation but increases taxes paid on intercorporate dividends.Zero
intercoporate ownership is optimal unless tax consolidation synergies net of dividend taxes
exceed gains from the tax shield. This outcome is likelier, for given cash flow correlation,
the lower is the IDT rate.
In the US, the threshold for consolidation (ω¯ = 80%) also triggers a zero tax rate
on intercorporate dividends.26 Such tax design eliminates the above-mentioned trade-
off associated with intercorporate ownership. Based on our tenet that corporate choices
respond to IDT, we expect a discontinuity in the presence of hierarchical groups above
this threshold, with larger subsidiary dividends and higher debt in parent companies. 27
3.5 Prohibiting bail-outs: welfare diminishing IDT
This section analyzes the impact of IDT on financial stability when there is no bail-
out mechanism between the parent and its affiliate. This analysis sheds light on the
consequences of limited cash-flow verifiability by courts. It also represents the outcome
of recent prudential rules, as both the Volcker Rule and the Vickers Committee limit the
possibility for banking firms to bail-out their SPV affiliates.28
Lemma 2 indicates that the parent optimally raises debt when it does not consider
bailing out its subsidiary in case of distress. This is because the credit risk spreads
25Tax consolidation is an option at the Federal level in the US and in other EU jurisdictions such as
France, Italy and Spain, provided intercorporate ownership exceeds some predetermined thresholds. It
is forbidden in certain jurisdictions, such as the UK and some US states.
26A minority interest may however be sufficient for financial conduits.
27Consolidation benefits without IDT may explain the presence of wholly-owned subsidiaries in EU
non-financial groups (Faccio and Lang, 2002) as well as larger debt raised by parent companies (Bianco
and Nicodano, 2006). In contrast, IDT in the US may more frequently lead to direct ownership or
horizontal groups (La Porta et al. (1999)), Morck (2005) and Morck and Yeung (2005), Amit and
Villalonga, (2009)).
28See the discussion in Segura (2014).
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required by investors without a guarantee from the sponsoring bank would not allow to
raise sufficient debt, as observed by Jones (2000) in the case of securitization. Moreover,
the parent fully owns its subsidiary when it is not subject to intercorporate dividend
taxation. Full intercorporate ownership maximizes the flow of subsidiary dividend to the
parent, which may use it to honor its debt obligations. Such “dividend support” is more
valuable when cash-flow correlation is lower.
Table 4 numerically illustrates the case without IDT as cash-flow correlation varies
(second to last column). Total debt is larger, implying a larger tax shield, as correlation
falls. Yet default costs fall with correlation, despite higher debt. Default costs drop from
2.13 when ρ = 0.8 to 0.39 when ρ = −0.8. Correspondingly, total debt increases from
134 to 157. The reason is that subsidiary dividends tend to be larger, when the parent
is less profitable, the lower the correlation. Anticipating this support, lower correlation
is also associated with more debt shifting from the subsidiary onto the parent. Debt in
subsidiary (parent) equals 47(87) when ρ = 0.8, while they respectively become 25(132)
when ρ = −0.8.
The first column reports the case with IDT. A high enough dividend tax rate makes
zero intercorporate ownership optimal. Given a ban on credible bail-outs, stand-alone
firms emerge as the value maximizing organization for the entrepreneur. The introduction
of IDT leads to a lower optimal debt in stand alone organizations, yet default costs are
higher than in the complex organization unless cash flow correlation exceeds 0.5. For
lower correlation, the support provided by subsidiary dividends to the parent leads to
smaller expected default costs in the complex organization than in stand-alone firms.
This example suggests that enforcing a ban of sponsor guarantees leads to full in-
tercorporate ownership and a more balanced capital structure. A comparison with the
previous table reveals that this ban, per se, achieves default costs that are lower than
the ones that groups generate under Thin Cap rules (for ρ = 0.2). Combining IDT with
a ban, however, may increase financial instability if it leads the entrepreneur to prefer
stand-alone firms, thus eliminating the dividend support mechanism.
4 Summary and Concluding Comments
This is the first model investigating the link between tax policy, ownership structure and
the default of complex organizations.
Policy implications are clear-cut. One tax policy tool in isolation is unable to restore
both their leverage and tax burden to the levels of stand alone firms. With IDT, a
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Table 3: Welfare effects of IDT, pi = 0
IDT No IDT
Cash-flow Correlation (ρ)
-0.8 -0.5 -0.2 0 0.2 0.5 0.8
Value (ν) 162.94 165.19 164.47 164.01 163.84 163.71 163.55 163.59
Parent Debt (FP ) 57 132 108 100 96 90 86 87
Subsidiary Debt (FS) 57 25 35 37 40 42 45 47
Default costs (C) 1.78 0.39 0.84 1.16 1.41 1.45 1.72 2.13
Table 4: This table reports the value, the debts and the total default costs of the complex organization
without bail-out guarantee. In the first column the IDT tax rate is so high to make direct ownership
optimal. In columns 2-8 the IDT rate is zero so that the subsidiary is wholly-owned.
horizontal group, or a sponsor-financial conduit structure, is able to preserve the high
leverage of a hierarchical structure since it also relies on internal bail-outs to enhance
the tax shield. Similarly, Thin Capitalization Rules alone result in debt shifting from the
debt-capped subsidiary towards its parent company.
A combination of both Intercorporate Dividend Taxes and Thin Capitalization Rules
effectively prevents debt shifting and contains total group leverage. Default costs in
complex organizations may fall below the ones of stand-alone firms, as bail-outs are
no longer targeted to increase the affiliates’ tax-shield. This result offers a rationale
for the presence of both tools in the design of US tax policy. Yet, it appears that
financial conduits are effectively exempt, despite enjoying the favorable tax treatment of
interest deductions. Our analysis implies that such favourable tax treatment contributes
to triggering financial instability.
We also study the effects of a ban on subsidiary bail-outs, which appears in both the
Volcker Rule and the UK Financial Services Act. Our analysis indicates that, absent
bail-out guarantees, parent companies lever up and fully own their affiliates and capital
structure is more balanced. In such a context, Intercorporate Dividend Taxation may
impair the stabilizing effect of the ban and may deliver higher expected default costs even
if overall debt falls.
Finally, our paper considers interest deductibility as the motivating distortion for our
second best analysis. He and Matvos (2015) provide a welfare rationale for this privilege
to debt, showing that it accelerates creative destruction in declining industries. Further
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Appendix A - Definition of the h(·) function
The function h(XS) defines the set of states of the world in which the parent company
has enough funds to intervene in saving its affiliate from default while at the same time
remaining solvent. The rescue happens if the cash flows of the parent XP are enough to
cover both the obligations of the parent and the remaining part of those of the subsidiary.
The function h(XS), which defines the level of parent cash flows above which rescue





1−τ − XS1−τ XS < XZS ,
XdP +X
d
S −XS XS ≥ XZS .
When XS < X
Z
S the cash flow XS of the subsidiary does not give rise to any tax
payment, as it is below the tax shield generated in that unit.
Appendix B - Proofs
Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the minimum program
Before proving the results presented in the paper, let us provide the set of Kuhn Tucker
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− ∂∆C(F ∗P ,F ∗S)
∂FP
= µ1, (i)
F ∗P ≥ 0, (ii)
µ1F
∗










− ∂Γ(F ∗P ,F ∗S)
∂FS






F ∗S ≥ 0, (v)
µ2F
∗
S = 0, (vi)
µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0 (vii)
−∂∆C(F ∗P ,F ∗S ,ω∗)
∂ω
+





= µ3 + µ4 (viii)
ω∗ − 1 ≤ 0 (ix)
ω∗ ≥ 0 (x)
µ3(ω
∗ − 1) = 0 (xi)
µ4(ω
∗) = 0 (xii)
µ3 ≤ 0, µ4 ≥ 0 (xiii)
−∂Γ(F ∗P ,F ∗S)
∂pi
= µ5 + µ6 (xiv)
pi∗ − 1 ≤ 0 (xv)
pi∗ ≥ 0 (xvi)
µ5(pi
∗ − 1) = 0 (xvii)
µ6(pi
∗) = 0 (xviii)
µ5 ≤ 0, µ6 ≥ 0 (xix)
(12)
Proof of Lemma 1
The integral expressions of ∆C and ∆T read
















∆T (FS, ω) = φωτD
∫ +∞
XdS
[(1− τS)x+ τSXZS − FS)]f(x)dx.
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XdP − ω(1− τD)
[
(1− τS)y + τSXZS − FS
])×

















(XdP − ω(1− τD)
[
(1− τS)y + τSXZS − FS
]
)×






















(1− τD)[(1− τS)y + τSXZS − FS]×
× (XdP − ω(1− τD)[(1− τS)y + τSXZS − FS])]× (14)
× g (XdP − ω(1− τD) [(1− τS)y + τSXZS − FS] , y) dy ≥ 0.
∆C is non-decreasing in ω, as default costs saved in the parent through dividends are
higher the higher the dividend transfer from the subsidiary. The change in the tax burden
due to IDT is always non-decreasing in ω as well, as – ceteris paribus – higher dividend






(x(1− τS) + τSXZS − FS)f(x)dx ≥ 0. (15)
This derivative takes zero value when τD = 0.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the Kuhn Tucker conditions (i) to (xiii) in (12). We investigate the existence
of a solution in which F ∗P = 0 and F
∗
S > 0. This implies µ1 ≥ 0 and µ2 = 0. We






a negative limit as subsidiary debt, FS tends to zero, and a positive one when goes to
infinity, since the rest of the l.h.s. does, under the technical assumptions that xf(x)
converges as x −→ +∞ (see Luciano and Nicodano, 2014).
The derivative ∂∆C(FP ,FS)
∂FS
|F ∗P=0 = 0. Moreover, ∂∆T∂FS is always lower than or equal to zero,
and has a negative limit as FS goes to zero since limFS−→0
∂XZS
∂FS
= 1 − φ(1 − G(0)) > 0.
When FS goes to infinity,
∂∆T
∂FS
goes to zero as G(XdS) tends to one. Hence, we proved
that, when F ∗P = 0 there exists an F
∗
S > 0, which solves the equation that equates the
l.h.s. of condition (iv) to zero.
As for condition (i), notice that the derivative ∂∆C
∂FP
also vanishes at F ∗P = 0. Hence,
we look for conditions for the l.h.s. to be positive and set it equal to µ1 to fulfill the
condition. We know from Luciano and Nicodano (2014) that this condition is satisfied for
a certain F ∗S when pi = 1 and that, when pi = 0, the l.h.s. is negative at F
∗
P = 0, because
a stand alone firm is never unlevered. Moreover, the l.h.s is increasing in pi. Thus, by
continuity and convexity of the objective function, there exists a value p¯i above which
the l.h.s. is positive. pi ≥ p¯i is then a necessary – and sufficient, given our convexity
assumption – condition, given F ∗S , for the existence of a solution in which F
∗
P = 0.
When pi is above p¯i and τD = 0, the dividend from the subsidiary to the parent does
not affect the parent value, as it does not affect its default costs (∆C=0). Also, ∆T=0
when τD = 0. Intercorporate ownership ω has no effect on the default costs: notice
that when F ∗P = 0, condition (viii) is always satisfied, for any ω. The tax burden of
the subsidiary and its value are independent of ω: ω∗ is indefinite and part (i) of our
proposition is proved.
When pi < p¯i, leverage is optimally raised also by the parent as there exists no solution
in which F ∗P = 0. We consider now ω
∗ when F ∗P > 0. When ω
∗ = 0, µ4 ≥ 0, µ3 = 0.
Condition (viii) is violated, since the l.h.s. is negative at ω = 0 from (15). The existence
of an interior solution, 0 < ω∗ < 1, requires both µ3 = 0 and µ4 = 0. Condition (viii)
is satisfied only for ω∗ → ∞, which violates condition (ix). Hence, no interior solution
satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Finally, let us analyze the corner solution ω∗ = 1, which requires µ3 ≤ 0, µ4 = 0. Con-
dition (viii) is satisfied for appropriate µ3 and all other conditions can be satisfied at
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F ∗S , F
∗
P , ω
∗ = 1. It follows that ω∗ = 1 when τD = 0 and part (ii) is proved.
Proof of Theorem 1
We first show that the optimal commitment to bail-outs is full. First of all, we remark
that −∂Γ
∂pi
is always negative as one can easily derive from equation (8). It follows that the
only value of pi∗ that satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions is pi∗ = 1. If pi∗ 6= 1, indeed,
the right hand side of condition (iv) is either zero or positive, leading to violation of the
conditions. It follows then immediately from Lemma 2, part (i) that F ∗P = 0 and that ω
∗








SA if pi = 1, ω = 1
and α/τ > Q (see Luciano and Nicodano (2014)). Here we have pi∗ = 1, F ∗P = 0 and FS
depends on ω only trough the parent debt. Then the statement is true.
Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 1 proves that optimal PS structures, absent IDT, are characterized by pi∗ = 1
and that, in that case, F ∗P = 0. Let us now introduce IDT. Analogous discussion of the
Kuhn Tucker conditions w.r.t. Lemma 2 part (ii) allows us to state that as soon as pi > p¯i
there exists a solution in which F ∗P = 0, F
∗
S > 0 even when τD > 0. Moreover, we know
from the proof of Theorem 1 that pi∗ = 1, the result being independent of τD. When
τD > 0, ω





= 0, while ∂∆T
∂ω
is strictly positive as soon as τD > 0, leading
to contradiction unless ω∗ = 0 and hence µ3 = 0. The entrepreneur who can freely select
ownership or payout optimally sets ω∗ = 0 as soon as τD > 0, with no influence on
optimal value in the optimal arrangement. Indeed, when ω = 0 both ∆C and ∆T are
0 for every (FP , FS) couple. The presence or absence of IDT is then irrelevant at the
optimum for value, capital structure choices, default costs and welfare.
Proof of Theorem 3
Before proving Theorem 3, we prove this useful lemma:
Lemma 3 Assume F ∗P > 0 and τD > 0 and let 0 < τD ≤ τ¯D < 1. Then: i) if τD >
τD > 0, optimal intercorporate ownership is less than full (ω
∗ < 1); ii) if τD > τ¯D, then
optimal intercorporate ownership is zero (ω∗ = 0).
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Proof. Let us consider first the case in which τD > 0. In particular, we look for a
condition on τD such that ω
∗ = 0. This implies µ4 ≥ 0, µ3 = 0 in (12). Condition (viii)













(x(1− τS) + τSXZ∗S − F ∗S)f(x)dx = µ4,





+∞ when ω goes to 0 and we denoted with XZ∗i and Xd∗i for i = P, S the thresholds
evaluated at the optimum. The l.h.s. of the above equation is non-positive for τD = 0
and it is increasing in τD, since its first derivative with respect to τD is strictly positive.
It follows that a necessary condition for the existence of a solution where ω∗ = 0, for
given F ∗S and F
∗
P , is that τD is higher than a certain level τ¯D. This quantity depends on
αP , σ, ρ, τS, τH , φ, µ. If τD < τ¯D, then ω
∗ > 0. This proves part i).
Opposite considerations apply when looking for solutions where ω∗ = 1. Condition (viii),







(1− τD)[(1− τS)y + τSXZ∗S − F ∗S ]×
× (Xd∗P − (1− τD)[(1− τS)y + τSXZ∗S − F ∗S ])]×







(x(1− τS) + τSXZ∗S − F ∗S)f(x)dx = µ3,
and µ3 ≤ 0. When τD = 0 the first term of the sum on the l.h.s. of the equation is
negative and the second disappears, whereas when τD = 1 the first term disappear, while
the second is positive. Hence, by continuity, there exists a level of τD, τD, above which
no ω∗ = 1 solution is present. Notice that under the additional assumption that g(·, ·) is
non-decreasing in the first argument below XdP , then τD ≤ τ¯D. This concludes our proof
of part ii) of the lemma.
We now prove part a) of the theorem first. The presence of a cap on subsidiary debt
introduces a further constraint in the optimization program: F ∗S ≤ K, where K is the




























= µ2 − µ3,
(vii)′ : µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0, µ3 ≥ 0
(xx)′ : µ3(F ∗S −K) = 0
Let us consider the case in which the newly introduced constraint (xx)’ is binding, so
that F ∗S = K. We look for the conditions under which the parent can be unlevered.
Hence, µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 = 0, µ3 ≥ 0. We focus on condition (i), and we refer the reader to the
proof of Lemma 2 for the discussion of other conditions, which is immediate. Condition
(i), when F ∗P = 0 and F
∗























While the first term is negative, the second one is null when K = 0 and is increasing













It follows that condition (i) can be satisfied only for sufficiently high K: no solutions
with an unlevered parent exist unless K is high enough. We define as K¯(αS) the cap
























Considerations similar to the unconstrained case apply to condition (iv)’, which is
met at F ∗S = K by an appropriate choice of µ3. Notice also that the higher αS, the lower
the required cap level K that allows for the presence of an optimally unlevered parent
company. From the proof of Lemma 2 part (ii) we know that, when τD = 0, as soon as
F ∗P > 0, the only optimal value of ω which does not violate the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
(viii) and (ix) is ω∗ = 1. This concludes our proof of part a) of the theorem.
As for part b), it follows from Lemma 3 that if τD is high enough, optimal ownership
structure, which, following previous considerations, implies ω∗ = 1 when τD = 0 as soon
as F ∗P > 0, modifies. Even when ω
∗ is unchanged, the dividend transfer is lowered for
fixed capital structure. The firm may adjust its capital structure choices accordingly, by
changing F ∗S and F
∗
P . For fixed capital structure, we remark that the objective function
is increasing in τD. However, overall effects on optimal value depend on τD, as well as on
other variables, and are hardly predictable. When F ∗S = K we simply notice that ID is
decreasing in τD, everything else fixed, as evident from equation (6).
When τD > τ¯D, we know from Lemma 3 that optimal ownership ω
∗ = 0. In such case,
∆C = 0 and ∂∆C
∂FP
= 0. In order to fulfill condition (i) if −∂∆C
∂FP
decreases, the remaining




(see Luciano and Nicodano, 2014) and the sum of tax burden and default costs of the
stand-alone is convex by assumption, FP must decrease. This concludes our proof of part
b).
Proof of Theorem 4
We know from Luciano and Nicodano (2014) that conditional guarantees are value in-




P , FSA) ≥ 2νSA(FSA). We want to show that, when τD ≥ τ¯D:
2CSA(F
∗
SA) ≥ CP + CS,
which amounts to showing that:
CSA(F
∗
SA) ≥ CSA(F ∗P )− Γ(F ∗P , F ∗SA)−∆C(F ∗P , F ∗SA, ω∗). (17)
We know from previous considerations that the f.o.c. for a solution to the PS problem








































≤ 0, since the guarantee is more valuable the lower FP
is, and non-zero as soon as pi > 0. Also, when τD > τ¯D, ∆C = 0 for all FP and FS since
ω∗ = 0. Since by our assumption TSA +CSA is convex in the face value of debt, it follows
that F ∗P < F
∗
SA and, as a consequence, that (17) is verified.
Appendix C - Intercorporate Dividend Taxation in US
and EU
The European Union, as well as most other developed countries, limits the double taxation
of dividends. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive (1990) requires EU member states not to
tax intercorporate dividends to and from qualified subsidiaries, whose parent’s equity
stake exceeds a threshold, as small as 10% since January 2009. The Member State of
the parent company must either exempt profits distributed by the subsidiary from any
taxation or impute the tax already paid in the Member State of the subsidiary against
the tax payable by the parent company. A 2003 amendment prescribes to impute any
tax on profits paid also by successive subsidiaries of these direct subsidiary companies.
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IDT is typical of the US tax system. In order to understand the reason for its in-
troduction, scholars go back to the years following the Great Depression when Congress
promoted rules to discourage business groups. In the 1920s business groups were com-
mon in the U.S., but they were held responsible of the 1929 crisis. Morck (2005) gives
an overview of the downsides attributed to pyramids, ranging from market power to
tax avoidance through transfer pricing. During the Thirties, Congress eliminated con-
solidated group income tax filing, enhanced transparency duties, offered tax advantages
to capital gains from sales of subsidiaries and introduced intercorporate dividend taxa-
tion.The action of the Congress induced companies either to sell their shares in controlled
subsidiaries or to fully acquire them: by the end of the Thirties US firms were almost
entirely stand-alone companies. Today, the tax rate on intercorporate dividends is equal
at least to 7% if intercorporate ownership is lower than 80%.
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